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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BANK OF EPHRAIM,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14514

-vsHALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY STEINMANN,
BABYLON CORPORATION, PRUDENTIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS, FIRST STATE BANK,
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Sixth
Judidial District Court as to the priorities of certain
judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court awarded Judgment on a Decree of
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim,
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings and Loan

Association and the Utah State Tax Commission as per the
Complaints of each creditor.

The rights of the defendant

Steinmann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon
Corporation.

The defendants First State Bank and United

States of America were previously dismissed as parties
defendant to the action.
In its judgment and decree of foreclosure the
District Court in addition to awarding Judgments to the
judgment creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments
of each creditor, as is set forth in the Statement of Facts.
It is from these priorities that the plaintiff appellant
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court declare
that the trial court was in error in granting the defendants
Babylon Corporation and Prudential Federal Savings priorities
on their judgments ahead of the entire judgment of the plaintiff,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There are generally no controversies concerning the
facts of the case which are basically as follows:
The case involves three parcels of property described below:
- 2 -

PARCEL 1
Beginning at a point 1.94 chains North from the
Southwest corner of Block 57 as platted in Plat
"A" Manti City Survey, thence East 4.20 chains,
thence North 33° West, along Manti City Creek,
1.10 chains, thence West 3,55 chains, thence
South 1.00 chain to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 2
Beginning at a point 234.96 feet South, thence
129 feet East from the Northwest corner of Block
57, as platted in Plat "A" Manti City Survey,
thence North 48° East 14 feet, thence North 40.25
feet, thence East 66 feet, thence South 49.50 feet,
thence West 7 6.33 feet to beginning. 0.465 acres.
PARCEL 3
All of Lot 9, Block 44, Plat "A", Manti City Survey,
Sanpete County, State of Utah, containing 0.60 acre,
more or less
Parcels 1 and 2 have a cafe known as Hals Palace
Cafe, as an improvement and shall be hereafter referred to
as the cafe property.
Parcel 3 is a trailer court and shall hereafter be
referred to as the trailer property.
CAFE PROPERTY:
On the 7th day of August, 1970 the defendant, Halbert
Davis mortgaged to the Bank of Ephraim the Cafe Property and
signed a note at the time for the sum of $2,400.00.
On the face of the mortgage is typed a clause which reads:
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"This mortgage covers all additional advances
on this loan, the total principal amount not to exceed
$3,000.00."
Paragraph 2 of the printed portion of the mortgage
reads:
"To secure payment of any and all extensions or
renewals and successive extensions or renewals, of the note
above described, or of the indebtedness represented by the
same, and of any other indebtedness at any time existing
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, whether represented by
notes, drafts, open account or otherwise, and all the interest on all of the same, all of which extensions or renewals
shall be optional with the mortgagee, but at the mortgageef s
option may be made by new notes or otherwise and at, before,
or after maturity, and for all of which this mortgage shall
stand as a continuing security until paid."
On August 7, 1970 the defendant Halbert Davis gave
a second mortgage to Steven Kaye Steinmann and signed a
Promissory Note in favor of Steven Kaye Steinmann in the sum
of $14,500.00.

Both the note and the mortgage were subsequen

ly assigned to the defendant Babylon Corporation.
The mortgage to Steven Kaye Steinmann expressly set
forth the fact that it was secondary to the mortgage to the
Bank of Ephraim.
On June 6, 1972 the defendant Halbert Davis executed
a Promissory Note to the Bank of Ephraim in the sum of
$35,555.89.
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On June 21, 1972 defendant Davis execut ed an
installment note and mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings
& Loan Association in the sum of $4,073,40,

This amount

was later absorbed in the subsequent installment note and
mortgage of October 19, 1972 in the sum of $10,228.80.
On April 5, 1973 the defendant Halbert Davis executed
a Promissory NOte to the Bank of Ephraim in the sum of
$2,000.00 and on June 19, 1974 Davis executed a Promissory
Note to Bank of Ephraim in the sum of $5,384.00.
Further, on March 19, 1974 defendant Davis delivered
to Plaintiff, Bank of Ephraim, its note in the sum of $5,500.00
which is set forth in the Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief.
The interest of the Utah State Tax Commission is
represented by delinquent tax warrants for delinquent sales,
unemployment and Income Tax.
At the time of the trial on January 5, 1976 all the
parties presented evidence which the court took under advisement and later awarded judgment as follows:
(a) To the Bank of Ephraim, $43,037.00 Principal,
$6,536.75 interest and $3,000.00 attorney's fees
for a total judgment of $52,573.75, and Decree of
Foreclosure on the cafe property.
(b) To the Babylon Corporation, $13,269.52 principal,
$1,126.00 interest, $40.00 title report, $2,000.00
Attorney's fee for a total judgment of $16,435.52 and
a Decree of Foreclosure on the Cafe property.
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(c}_ To Prudential Federal Savings, $5,833.33 principal,
$25.00 title report, $900,00 attorney's fees for a total
Judgment of $6,750.33 and a Decree of Foreclosure on the
Cafe property.
(d)

To the Utah State Tax Commission, $2,76 6.73.

(e) To the Bank of Ephraim on its Third Cause of Action,
$5,500.00 principal, $900.00 attorney's fees and $996.11
interest for a total Judgment of $7,396.11 and a Decree of
Foreclosure on the Cafe property.
The court then assigned the following priorities on the
Cafe Property:
(1)

Bank of Ephraim
Plus interest at 10% per annum from
2/22/74
Plus reasonable attorney's fee of
Plus costs of Court in the sum of

(2)

Babylon Corporation
Plus reasonable attorney fees of
Plus interest at 8% per annum from
date

(3)

Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Associacion
Plus interest at 10% per annum
Plus Sttomey's fees

$3,000.00
600.00
27.10
14,395.52
2,000.00

5,833.37
900.00

(4)

Balance of Judgments to Bank of Ephraim
including amounts found due on its
Third Cause of Action

(5)

State of Utah Tax Warrants

2,766.73

TRAILER COURT PROPERTY:
On March 15, 1971 defendant, Davis, executed a
Promissory Note in the amount of $4,000.00 in favor of the
Bank of Ephraim, which was secured by a mortgage on the
trailer park property.
- 6 -

On the fact of this mortgage is typed a clause which reads:
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on
this loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $6,000,00."
Paragraph 2 of the printed portion of the mortgage reads:
"To secure payment of any and all extensions or
renewals, and successive extensions or renewals, of the
note above described, or of the indebtedness represented
by the same, and of any other indebtedness, at any time arising from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, whether represented
by notes, drafts, open account or otherwise, and all the
interest on all of the same, all of which extensions or renewals shall be optional with the mortgagee, but at the
mortgagee's option may be made by new notes or otherwise
and at, before, or after maturity, and for all of which the
mortgage shall stand as a continuing security until paid."
On June 21, 1972, defendant Davis obtained a loan
from Prudential Federal which was superceded by its subsequent loan on October 16, 1972.

This loan is the same as

the loan covered by the Cafe property above, Prudential's
mortgage covering both parcels of property.
Thereafter, on July 31, 1974 by an additional
Promissory Note, Halbert Davis borrowed an additional
$1,508.41 on the trailer court property from the Plaintiff.
The interest of the Utah State Tax Commission is the
same as on the cafe property.
The defendant Babylon Corporation is not an interesed
party in the trailer court property.
The evidence on the trailer court was submitted to
the court as was done on the Cafe property and the court
awarded judgment as follows:
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(a)

To the Bank of Ephraim, $5,508,41 principal,

$941.48 interest, $750.00 attorney's fee for a total
judgment of $7,229.89, and a Decree of Foreclosure
on the trailer property.
(b)

To Prudential Federal Savings the same judgment

as given on the Cafe property.
(c)

To Utah State Tax Commission - same judgment

as on Cafe property.
The court then assigned the following priorities on
trailer property:
(1)

Bank of Ephraim
$5,508.41
Plus interest of
971.48
Plus reasonable attorney fee of
750.00
and interest at rate of 8% from date
of Judgment until paid

(2)
(3)
(4)

Prudential Federal Savings
Same as in Cafe property.
Bank of Ephraim
Balance of indebtedness owned on
all obligations
Utah Stat^ Tax Commission
Same as in Cafe property

It is from the decision of the Court assigning the
priorities as to the Cafe property from which the plaintiff
takes this appeal.

Plaintiff does not contest the priorities

of the court as they apply to the trailer property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARAGRAPH 2(a)

OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN AWARDING THE JUDGMENTS OF
DEFENDANT BABYLON CORPORATION AND PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
PRIORITY OVER THE BALANCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS TO THE BANK
OF EPHRAIM.
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The Plaintiff's position as supported by the
authorities cited below is that all the promissory notes
and mortgage by which the notes are secured are a first
priority over all other lien claims.
The plaintiff admits at the beginning that the
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and
not obligatory under the mortgage.
The contention of the Defendant Prudential Federal
Savings at the time of trial was that since the advances
made by the bank were optional, that the lien priority is
determined as of the time the advances were actually made,
and that in no event should the lien priority exceed $3,000.00
as set forth on the face of the mortgage.
The problem with this is that the bulk of the advances made by the Bank of Ephraim on the Cafe property
were prior to the time Prudential Federal Savings made its
loan.

This is obviously why Prudential urges the $3,000.00

limitation.
To adopt this position, however, one has to take the
position that we should hold to one clause of the mortgage
and not to another.

Paragraph 2 of the mortgage plainly

includes all other loans of whatever nature.
The defendant Prudential and all other claimants
had notice of that clause, for it was on file and they only
_ 9 ~

had to inquire of the Bank of Ephraim as to any amounts
loaned under the mortgage before they extended any money
themselves.
Moreover, the finding of the court in regard to
priorities is a little conflicting*

The court holds the

Bank of Ephraim has a valid mortgage against the defendant
Davis for the full amount of the monies loaned, but says
that the priorities extend to only $3,000.00.

If Paragraph

2 of the mortgage is binding upon the defendant Davis, why
isn't it binding on the other parties defendant?

Plaintiff's

contention is that its priority is not limited by the
$3,000.00 figure in the mortgage and that it should be given
priority at a minimum for the advances made before intervening encumbrances were made.

Plaintiff further contends that

Paragraph 2 of the mortgage is sufficient to give it prioiity
over all lien holders.
A number of cases in various jurisdictions have dealt
with the above situation and while some of these cases have
held that advances made on a first mortgage after a second
mortgage are secondary to the second mortgage in terms of
priority, it is likewise true that a number of cases have hel
a mortgage of property given in good faith to secure future
advances is not regarded as invalid as against the holder
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of intervening subsequent interests,

Kentucky Lumber

& Mill Co. v. Kentucky Title Sav. Bank and T, Co,, 184
Ky 244, 211 S W 765; Batten v. Jurist; 306 Pa. 64, 158 A 557.
The generally prevailing doctrine seems to be that
advances made under a recorded mortgage given to secure
further optional advances will not be denied priority in lien
merely because the intervening encumbrancer could not have
determined from the mortgage, without extraneous inquiry,
the true amount of the indebtedness of advances secured
thereby.

Hurst v. Flynn-Harris-Ballard Co.

143 SE 503;

Exerist v. Carter 202 Iowa 498, 210 NW 559; Merchants
State Bank v. Tufts
Merc. Co. v. Hause

14 ND 238, 103 NW 760; Lawn Sprinkle
Tex Civ App 184 SW 737.

The case before the bar is very similar to the above
in that Prudential Federal Savings could have determined the
amount of indebtedness on the Bank of Ephraim mortgage by a
simple inquiry of the Bank.
Although there is contrary authority, the rule laid
down in most cases is that an advance, though purely optional,
made pursuant to a mortgage of which subsequent parties had
record or other sufficient notice, is a lien or charge superior to an encumbrance intervening between the giving of
the mortgage and the making of the advance, if the mortgagee
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had no knowledge and no actual notice of the intervening
encumbrance.

Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burnett, 106 Cal.514

30 P. 922, Schmidt v. Zahrndt

148 Ind. 447f 47 NE 335,

Passaic Nat Bank & Trust Co.v. Owens., Ill N J Eq 486 162
A 879, Hall v. Williamson Aro. Co.

69 W Va 671, 72 SE 780.

While the Bank of Ephraim may have had constructive
notice by reason of the recording of the Prudential mortgage,
they had no actual notice and in fact, the lionshare of the
advances made by the plaintiff Bank were prior in time to
those of Prudential Federal Savings.
Even if the Plaintiff had had actual notice of the
Second Mortgage, there is authority to support the proposition that the lien of an advance made under a mortgage to
secure optional future advances (of which mortgage subsequent
persons had record or other sufficient notice; takes priority
over an encumbrance intervening between the giving of the
mortgage and the making of the advance, even though the
mortgagee had actual notice or knowledge of the intervening
encumbrance.

Gray v. Helm

60 Miss 131, Wibczinski v.

Everman, 51 Miss 841; First Nat. Bank v. Zarafonetis (Tex Civ
App) 15 SW 2d 155.
The general rule would seem to be that before a
holder of a mortgage to secure future advances can be deprived of his superior equity on the ground of notice of an
- 12 -

intervening interest, actual notice thereof must be brought
to his attention.

Farmers Union Warehouse Co, v. Barnett

Bros. 273 Ala 435, 137 So. 176, Topia v. Demartini 77 Cal
383, 19 P 641; Corn Belt Trust & Sav. Bank vs.May.

197 Iowa

54, 196 NW 735.
No where in the record is there any evidence that
the plaintiff had any actual notice of the mortgage to
Prudential Federal Savings.
It is further of interest that the Utah Supereme
Court seems never to have squarely come to grips with this
question.

Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham 11

U 2d 159, 356 P 2d 281 seems to uphold the position of Prudential Federal Savings on first reading, but a more careful
reading shows two things,
1.

That the actual holding of the court was to

remand the case back to the District Court for more definite
findings and thus any statement made as to priority of liens
is dicta.
2.

That the case actually involved the question of

priority of liens of a mortgage and subsequent liens on
material men under our mechanics lien statute.
Thus the Utah Courts have never actually determined
the question of priority and the only case may be clearly
seen as not being in point.
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As a matter of fact, nearly all the cases which
hold for the position of Prudential Federal Savings have
dealt with priority as it exists between the mortgagee
and intervening materials men.
There are some very good reasons to distinguish the
materials men cases from the case at hand, one being the
fact that in a materialsmen case the mortgagee making the
subsequent advances has every reason to know or believe t].at
the money he advances will be used to make improvements which
immediately raises the probability of a materialsmen lien.
This is not the case with a second mortgagee.
The Steinmann or Babylon morrgage is no different
than the Prudential Mortgage except that the advances by
the Bank were all made after the giving of the Steinmann
mortgage by the defendant Davis.
It is evidently clear that Steinmann knew of the
mortgage to Bank of Ephraim as she expressly made her mortgag
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim,

She not

only had construction notice by actual notice of the mortgage
but was aware of the Provisions of Paragraph 2 of the mortgag
She further knew that the defendant Davis was palnnin
to make a cafe out of the property, and that the Plaintiff
would be advancing large sums of money to the defendant Davis
for the needed improvement of the property.
- 14 -

CONCLUSION
The contention of the Plaintiff Bank of Ephraim
is that Paragraph 2 of its mortgage does not place dollar
limitations on it which limits its priority, that there is
further clear authority to support the priority of its
advances over any intervening liens and that on the basis
of the notice and our statutes, this court should grant
priority to the plaintiffs over all the lien claimants
and remand the case back for Findings of Fact consistent
therewith.

le^pectfully submitted,
MDUIS G./TERVORT
/^RISCHpffiCHT & TERVORT
Attorneys for th£
Plaintiff-Appellants
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